Relatively speaking, after the end of the Cold War, the United States appeared immune to Russia. Despite Russian military attacks against Estonia, Georgia, the Ukraine and others in the ensuing years, the United States was large and powerful, and any real, residual threat was neutralized when the Soviet Union dissolved. However, the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to history. And indeed, America’s false sense of security was made apparent when Russia intervened in the November 2016 elections.
In hindsight, the United States should have expected that Russia would search for new purpose after its empire collapsed. The transition from superpower to “something else” was, in part, a search for Russian identity. And although Russia has yet to settle on the principles of this new “nationhood,” it has returned to two very old narratives: First, that America is an enemy; and second, that Russia is a “besieged fortress, surrounded by enemies.”
At least partially, Russian efforts to undermine the United States and the West in general are a predictable consequence of those narratives. With respect to the 2016 election, using disinformation as a primary means to sow derision has clear benefits for Russia in that it is effective and remarkably low cost. And, perhaps more importantly, modern Russia does not need to develop a new strategy for this kind of attack, as its Soviet predecessors left a well-developed playbook from which to borrow many methods and objectives.
Using these low-cost disinformation campaigns to divide America, undermine the West and undercut the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effectively serves the greater purpose of increasing Russia’s power relative to the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his circle are making use of the underlying nature of democracy to turn these objectives into reality. For example, people within democracies ultimately decide what happens in their societies, including the future of foreign and military policy.5 Accordingly, if it can successfully divide the people or persuade them to push for what are, in fact, Russian policy preferences, Russia may be able to gain power while weakening the United States.
Efforts to study Russia’s recent attempts to conduct disinformation campaigns are already clarifying exactly how they take advantage of social media platform tools (like trending hashtags) to bolster their efforts. Yet, focusing on recent efforts alone may be insufficient, either to thoroughly analyze the recent disinformation campaigns or to identify new ones in their nascent stages. Indeed, along with academic analyses of previous Russian efforts, the large number of declassified archival documents, especially coming out of CREST—the vault of declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents—reveals significant insights into the development and execution of historic Soviet disinformation campaigns that are relevant to Russian efforts today.
In view of this reality, the present study is comprised of three parts: First, it briefly reviews Russian disinformation efforts prior to the Cold War. It then examines a series of disinformation campaigns launched during the Reagan administration for lessons about why and how the Soviets executed them. And finally, it reviews lessons learned in an effort to inform today’s response to recent Russian disinformation efforts.
One note before proceeding: This paper primarily uses the terms “disinformation and propaganda,” or just “disinformation,” in part, because this is the terminology the U.S. government uses to describe foreign government campaigns to manipulate information. Notably, these terms and others were also used during the Cold War. The Soviets themselves called it “dezinformatsiya,” which refers to techniques they used to get false information into the foreign media. Likewise, the State Department-led Active Measures Working Group that studied Soviet influence activities described propaganda as “information that reflects the perceptions or perspectives of a government,” which is spread through “deceptive operations that attempt to manipulate the opinions and/or actions of individuals, publics or governments.” Active measures of propaganda included “the use of front groups or the spread of disinformation (lies).”
