The framers of the Constitution established our republic on the premise of limited government and divided power. Congress was designed to be primus inter pares—first among equals—as the institution closest to the people and the surest check against autocracy. As James Madison wrote, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Unfortunately, the executive branch has relentlessly pushed to expand the contours of its power over the last century, and Congress has failed to assert itself in response. 

The most recent flashpoint between the legislative and executive branches is also a symbolic one, the Library of Congress. Despite its name and its statutory purpose as being established for Congress, the Library is now the subject of a legal and political struggle over whether it is a part of the executive branch and thus subject to presidential control.

At issue are the core constitutional principles of separation of powers and balance of powers. In addition to playing the traditional role of a library, the Library of Congress also houses the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Copyright Office, and the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights—all institutions that are overseen by Congress. However, the president, with Senate confirmation, appoints the Library’s top official, the librarian of Congress, who serves a 10-year term. 

Amid this structural ambiguity, President Donald J. Trump’s recent decision to remove Carla Hayden, the then-Librarian of Congress, before the end of her term and to install a Department of Justice (DOJ) official as acting librarian—bypassing any congressional consultation—has fueled significant controversy. Two days after Hayden was terminated, an official from the White House Presidential Personnel Office also terminated Shira Perlmutter, the Register of Copyrights and Director of the Copyright Office. It has been reported that two other DOJ officials were named as the new deputy librarian and acting director of the Copyright Office.

Defenders of the president’s actions point to precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that “the Librarian is a ‘Head of Department’ with the Executive Branch.” The court reasoned that because some components of the Library, namely the Copyright Office, exercises executive powers, the librarian, as the top official, would therefore be an executive officer rather than a legislative one. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit stated that not only is the librarian “appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate,” but also she “is subject to unrestricted removal by the President.”

From that angle, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (“Vacancies Act”), which permits the president to fill vacant executive agency roles on a temporary basis, might seem applicable. However, a closer reading of both the statute and the structure of the Library suggests otherwise. The Vacancies Act authorizes the president to fill temporary vacancies only in executive agencies. It is important to note that Congress has not designated the Library of Congress as such, and it is funded through the annual legislative branch appropriation bill. In fact, Congress has explicitly delegated governance of the Library to the librarian—not to the president. The statute does not empower the president to name an acting librarian. Rather, interim leadership defaults to the next ranking official in accordance with Library policy.

This distinction matters. While Congress gave the president a role in appointing the librarian, it did not grant sweeping executive control over the agency’s operations or interim leadership. The president’s unilateral designation of an acting librarian risks undermining congressional oversight, confidentiality of legislative research, and even constitutional norms.

Indeed, the implications go far beyond the Library’s walls. Lawmakers across party lines have expressed concern over the encroachment on legislative branch independence. Sens. Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) have emphasized that the Library must remain an institution of Congress, not an arm of the executive. Additionally, Speaker Mike Johnson and Senate Majority Leader John Thune have expressed concerns about the president appointing acting officials for the Library and its offices. The CRS processes over 75,000 requests annually—many of them highly sensitive—from members of Congress. Allowing the White House to influence or potentially surveil these operations could chill honest legislative inquiry.

Congress has already responded to similar executive overreach. In 2023, it removed the president’s role in appointing the architect of the Capitol, placing that authority solely with a bipartisan congressional commission.

A similar restructuring may now be warranted for the Library of Congress. Because the Copyright Office wields executive powers, allowing the president to appoint the librarian can be seen as a necessary check within the constitutional system of balances. Therefore, to protect the institutional identity of the Library, the Copyright Office—and any other institution that performs executive operations—should be transferred into a separate executive agency. Further, using a congressional commission to appoint the librarian would give the House of Representatives a role in the selection process—something it currently lacks.

Ultimately, while the president may have authority to appoint—and remove—the librarian, he does not have the authority to designate an acting librarian, nor fill any subordinate positions. Congress must act decisively to defend the structural integrity of its institutions. Madisonian principles demand no less.

 

 

 

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