How Burdensome, Fragmented State Data Privacy Laws Risk Worsening Scams
In 2018, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went into effect, a data-privacy law establishing sweeping new rules governing how businesses collect, process, and use personal data. Seems simple enough, but look under the hood and you’ll find a host of unintended consequences for innovation, competition, and the fight against fraud, scams, and other cyber threats.
As the GDPR was set to take effect in 2018, then-Associate Deputy U.S. Attorney General Sujit Raman warned of broad unintended consequences for the U.S. Justice Department’s efforts to combat fraud and scams. At the time, WHOIS, a public directory of who registers an internet domain name, was routinely used to identify suspicious websites and trace their operators. GDPR’s implementation would go on to severely restrict the information publicly available on WHOIS.
And the establishment of new data privacy rules and their consequences are not limited to Europe. In recent years, several states have stepped up efforts to pass stricter laws around how certain types of data are used by businesses. Now momentum is growing behind the EU-style approach, resulting in a shift away from emphasizing disclosure in how data is handled with consumers.
This all comes as Americans are growing increasingly concerned with the frequency and sophistication of fraud and scam attempts. A 2025 Pew poll found that 73% of Americans have encountered online scams or attacks, with 79% considering them a “major problem” and 68% indicating they believe AI will increase the frequency of such attacks. As the fight against fraud and scams becomes all the more relevant, so will the policies impacting how it is fought, intended or not.
GDPR Offers a Glimpse Into Unintended Consequences
In response to the GDPR, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the nonprofit that oversees the global domain-name system, adopted new rules that required domain registrars to redact much of the information about domain registrants that was previously publicly available. Although not every American domain registration is directly impacted by GDPR, the change meant registrars were allowed to apply these restrictions everywhere, including to U.S. domains, with compliance and operational considerations in mind. Since then, real-world consequences have materialized.
A survey by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and its partner M3AAWG warned that compliance and liability are, in part, driving redactions beyond the GDPR’s requirements, noting that the utility of WHOIS has been reduced “due to wide-ranging redactions beyond what is legally required.” If a website operator is harder to identify, that makes them harder to shut down for illegal activity.
In a July 2020 letter to Congress, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) highlighted the direct consequences, reporting that GDPR-related restrictions on WHOIS queries were “inhibiting” investigations into websites posing as pandemic-relief organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations’ foundations, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). “When HSI conducted WHOIS queries for these domains, most of the subscriber information was redacted as a result of GDPR.” The letter further states that “increased and expedient” access to previously available registrant information could have enabled HSI to identify those behind these scam websites and halt continued victimization more quickly.
The HSI example is one of many. Efforts to counter nefarious foreign information operations have also been complicated by WHOIS redactions. In 2018, for example, FireEye, a cybersecurity and threat intelligence firm, identified an Iranian regime-linked influence operation using WHOIS registration records, including email addresses and Iranian name servers, to establish connections between suspicious domains. The discovery prompted a broader Facebook investigation, which ultimately resulted in the removal of 650 groups, pages, and accounts for “coordinated inauthentic behavior that originated in Iran and targeted people across multiple internet services in the Middle East, Latin America, U.K., and U.S.” As GDPR went into effect, WHOIS records for domain names linked to the inauthentic news site network “literally disappeared before investigators’ eyes,” slowing their efforts.
Furthermore, IBM X-Force, the company’s cybersecurity research and threat intelligence division, reported a 91% decline in malicious domains identified and blocked using WHOIS. Globally, law enforcement has noted impact on investigations, too. A 2018 ICANN review team survey of 55 law enforcement entities, many on behalf of countries, asked if WHOIS was meeting “investigative needs” before and after May 2018. Before, 53% indicated “yes” and 45% “partially.” After, just 8% and 25% indicated the same, respectively.
And perhaps most starkly, a 2021 Interisle Consulting Group study estimated that while only around 11.5% of domains registered under generic top-level domains (like .com, .org, and .online) may belong to individuals subject to GDPR requirements, registrars and registry operators had redacted contact data from over 57% of them, or roughly five times what may actually be required.
A Shifting Momentum in Data Privacy in the States
Today, at least 23 states have enacted comprehensive consumer privacy laws, with four new bills becoming law this year alone. California has long been known for its particularly stringent privacy regulations, but the new Maryland Online Data Privacy Act (MODPA), which began enforcement in April 2026, goes further, particularly in certain restrictions it places on businesses.
In the United States, on data privacy, most states have generally allowed companies to collect and use consumer data for legitimate purposes when disclosed to consumers (subject to data-minimization and some other requirements.) The MODPA is a major departure from this orthodoxy that more closely resembles the direction the EU has taken on the issue. Now, other state government officials and agencies, including Connecticut’s Attorney General’s Office, are pointing to MODPA as a model. Maine, Massachusetts, and Minnesota are also considering similar regulations.
MODPA requires companies to limit collection to what is “reasonably necessary and proportionate.” For “sensitive data,” it’s even stricter, with collection, processing, or sharing required to be “strictly necessary.” Penalties for violations range from up to $10,000 per violation to $25,000 for repeat violations. So rather than simply requiring companies to disclose and justify the reason for using and collecting data, Maryland now substantially narrows the purposes for which companies may collect and use data in the first place.
MODPA’s impact will reach far beyond Maryland, with the law applying not only to those conducting business in Maryland, but also those who “produce products or services targeted at Maryland residents” and have “controlled or processed” the data of 35,000 or more Maryland residents. This is a low bar for companies with a large customer base, and can apply to many of America’s largest social media companies, e-commerce retailers, streaming services, and AI labs, wherever they’re based.
With enforcement starting only earlier this year and no publicly announced actions under the law yet, its impact is still not fully known. Nonetheless, both before and after the law’s passage, the private sector has been making its concerns clear.
In a 2024 letter, for example, the State Privacy & Security Coalition, an industry group of tech, retail, and telecom companies, warned that the law’s broad provision in identifying minors could result in websites that provide targeted advertising having to verify the ages of all customers, adding that this provision undermines consumer privacy: “We do not believe this is a pro-privacy stance for Maryland consumers, and businesses do not want to collect this type of sensitive information if they do not have to.”
Following the law’s passage, in a letter to the U.S. Justice Department in September 2025, the Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA), a tech and data industry trade organization, cautioned about severe compliance concerns over the Maryland law’s “strictly necessary” provision. “This undefined standard creates impossible compliance challenges. For example, what data is ‘strictly necessary’ for a recommendation algorithm? For fraud prevention? For accessibility features? Companies must guess at the answer, knowing that a regulator’s post-hoc determination could trigger substantial penalties.”
When companies have to “guess” where the compliance line is, overcompliance is incentivized. GDPR serves as an example of how incentives like this can hinder efforts to fight fraud and scams. Much of the broadness in MODPA’s language risks the same. And it’s not the only law raising concerns on this front, with SIIA and others also raising concerns about a New Jersey law.
That New Jersey law, Daniel’s Law, aims to protect people like judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers from being targeted at their home addresses by requiring companies, upon request, to stop disclosing certain information, like home addresses, about these protected individuals and their immediate family members.
While seeking to protect these individuals is a noble goal, as written, the law overreaches. Legitimate, business-to-business (B2B) data sharing used to fight fraud, even when data isn’t made public, is granted no exception. Upon request by a covered individual, companies have just ten business days to comply. And the penalty for failure to comply is no slap on the wrist, with damages per violation starting at $1,000. Importantly, Daniel’s Law is having an impact well beyond its state borders, with roughly 150 lawsuits filed under it, impacting companies even in Florida and California.
SIIA, joined by the Consumer Data Industry Association (CDIA) and Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access (CSPRA), filed a 2025 amicus brief arguing that Daniel’s Law violates the First Amendment. Among other things, the brief makes the case that the law could keep data providers from retaining data the financial institutions rely on to comply with federal rules requiring them to “identify and prevent identity theft,” noting addresses as “particularly useful” for that purpose.
The brief’s claims about such a requirement are grounded in existing federal requirements under the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, which requires financial institutions and creditors with covered accounts to establish and implement identity theft prevention programs. Federal rules also require banks to collect information, such as addresses, to verify customers are who they say they are, and may use third-party data providers to do so. And this is where the brief’s point about restrictions on addresses comes into focus: Daniel’s Law could impede the verification efforts of financial institutions by restricting how legitimate data providers supply address information.
Both the Maryland and New Jersey examples show how well-intentioned lawmaking can create unintended consequences, incentivizing overcompliance even in legitimate, non-public uses of data for fraud and scam prevention efforts. With both laws already reaching beyond their respective states, and similar legislation gaining traction across the country, compliance could grow increasingly complex nationwide. One state law is already impacting businesses in other states across the country. One EU law already creates sweeping obstacles to fighting cyber threats nationally. What might dozens of similar laws—or 50 of them—mean?
Carefully Crafted Federal Preemption Could Strike the Right Balance
A federal policy on data privacy that addresses both valid privacy concerns and legitimate uses of data could go a long way toward protecting consumer privacy without compromising the ability of businesses and other stakeholders to combat fraud, scams, and cyberattacks more broadly. Establishing it as one cohesive federal framework that preempts overlapping state privacy laws could prevent the chaos of navigating dozens of different and potentially conflicting state requirements.
Enabling appropriate uses of data does not have to come at the cost of consumer privacy protections. Congress can pass a law ensuring consumers maintain control of their data and require proper disclosure from firms on how they intend to use, collect, and retain that data. The same law can implement clear, carefully crafted exceptions for relevant firms and law enforcement entities handling data responsibly and for legitimate uses in fighting illegal activity. This would let firms combat fraud, scams, and other cyber threats without needing to guess about what is allowed.
What does the outlook for such a policy look like? Still murky. In 2022, the American Data Privacy and Protection Act, a data privacy bill carrying federal preemption among other provisions, cleared the House Energy and Commerce Committee 53-2, which is no small feat. Nevertheless, the bill’s language included major flaws of its own (some echoing MODPA) and stalled largely over disagreement around the preemption provision. And more recently, a 2026 data privacy bill (the SECURE Data Act) also proposing preemption failed to gain serious legislative momentum. In short, while the future of a comprehensive data privacy bill including preemption remains uncertain, the 2022 vote suggests it may not be impossible.
As public anxiety around fraud, scams, and other cyber threats grows, the United States has an opportunity to lead on data privacy policy without tying the hands of defenders. In an ever-evolving cyber landscape in which attackers use increasingly advanced AI, innovation is paramount to countering these threats. A fragmented and burdensome regulatory landscape that incentivizes overcompliance risks smothering that innovation, undermining efforts to find and stop attackers, and leaving consumers more susceptible to the very threats lawmakers seek to combat.