Low-Energy Fridays: How do we minimize security risks from uranium enrichment?
Iran’s uranium enrichment program has been a major issue of national security concern for a couple of decades now. In current national security debates, one camp maintains that the preservation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities in any form is intolerable. At the other extreme, Iran’s allies argue the country has a “right” to enrich uranium. It’s important to cut through these rhetorical arguments (which may obfuscate ulterior motivations) and focus instead on what uranium enrichment is, why it’s such a big deal, and how to mitigate the national security risks associated with nuclear energy.
Natural uranium is comprised of 99.3 percent non-fissionable isotope U-238 and 0.7 percent fissionable (fissile) U-235. Because its concentration of U-235 is too low, naturally occurring uranium must be “enriched” in order to sustain a nuclear reaction—whether for energy generation or a bomb. Conventional uranium enrichment processes separate the heavier U-238 from the lighter U-235, usually in centrifuges, with 1 kilogram of uranium containing 0.007 kilograms of fissile material. This means a large mass of uranium must be enriched to possess practical value. The actual “enrichment” is simply the removal of U-238 to leave behind a higher concentration of U-235 in the remaining mass.
The same technology that can produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes like energy generation can also be used to produce a weapon—the only distinguishing difference between applications is the degree of enrichment and the volume of uranium required to achieve it. Creating fuel for nuclear reactors requires uranium that has been enriched to have a concentration of 3 to 20 percent U-235, while a weapon requires a concentration of around 90 percent.
Unsurprisingly, peaceful application of uranium enrichment technology can be used as a smokescreen for a nuclear weapons program. To combat this, 191 nations (practically every country except India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Unfortunately, it is quite vague—as is often the case with treaties that garner almost total global support. But one core aspect of the NPT is that legitimate nuclear weapon states (i.e., United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) are supposed to aid non-weapon states in the production of nuclear energy. Essentially, the NPT is a quid-pro-quo designed to give non-weapon states the benefits of nuclear energy as long as they agree not to develop their own nuclear weapons.
Without going too far into the national security arguments surrounding nuclear weapons, the core rationale for the NPT is that having numerous nuclear weapon states amplifies the risk of nuclear warfare. Essentially, mitigating the spread of nuclear weapons is intended to mitigate risks. For this reason, even though the NPT itself lacks any stringent enforcement mechanisms against nations that violate its tenets, the global community typically sanctions malfeasance. The NPT is effective because an agreement not to pursue nuclear weapons is generally preferable to almost everyone than a costly and dangerous global nuclear arms race.
While Iran maintains their “right” to enrich uranium—something not outlined in the NPT—their intent to acquire nuclear weapons is apparent by their actions. The country has enriched uranium to 60 percent—well exceeding what is needed for any peaceful energy application. Additionally, non-weapon states can and do purchase nuclear fuel without their own enrichment programs. Despite there being only nine nations with nuclear weapons, 31 nations produce commercial electricity from nuclear energy, and over 50 have nuclear reactors for research and medical purposes (fission can also produce radiological materials that are useful for science and medicine). This strains the credibility of Iranian claims that their enrichment programs are required for peaceful nuclear energy use.
When it comes to nuclear technology, the intersection of energy and national security often hinges upon controlling elements of the “nuclear fuel cycle.” While only weapon states control the entirety of the supply chains needed to develop nuclear weapons, they provide select elements of the fuel cycle to non-weapon states for peaceful purposes. The challenge is that with nuclear weapons technology now over 80 years old, it is technologically feasible for many nations to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, the more secure avenue to avoiding the proliferation of these weapons is to control the flow of nuclear materials (i.e., to ensure that no one country can stockpile enough fissile material to create a bomb).
Past attempts at limiting Iran’s nuclear weapons program through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated under the Obama administration focused on limiting the country’s acquisition of nuclear materials; however, opponents who believed Iran should also give up their enrichment capabilities ultimately rejected the plan.
The tension between nuclear technology’s peaceful and militaristic applications is a challenge for policymakers. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons requires a global convention and enforcement of the “non-proliferation regime,” in which aspiring weapon states are heavily sanctioned. When the non-proliferation regime is unenforced, we can expect more nuclear weapon states to emerge—thereby worsening security dilemmas.
This is relatively simple from a practical perspective, as there is ample history of nations and international institutions controlling and monitoring nuclear materials and technology. The problem arises in how policymakers should respond when other nations reject the tenets of the non-proliferation regime. Energy policymakers should understand the nuclear proliferation risks associated with nuclear technology to ensure that policies do not exacerbate risks. However, the current situation between the United States and Iran is ultimately a national security issue rather than an energy one. Iran’s refusal to accept a peace that requires them to relinquish their weapons program—and President Trump’s refusal to accept Iran having a nuclear weapon—is what led to war. In other words, the situation will not resolve until both parties feel secure.
Nuclear energy has many benefits and many risks. While it’s possible to provide access to nuclear energy in a way that mitigates nuclear armament risks, enforcing a nonproliferation regime requires a considerable level of global cooperation. For these reasons, while energy policymakers should be aware of how nuclear energy can exacerbate proliferation risk, they should also appreciate that energy access can prop up bad-faith defense of nuclear weapons programs.