This is the second installment in a six-part series about the institutions that shape prosecutorial decisions within the American justice system. Read the introduction and view other posts here.

When Luigi Mangione was charged in the killing of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson in New York City in 2024, he faced separate state and federal prosecutions. The Manhattan district attorney brought murder and weapons charges under New York law, and federal prosecutors under the Biden administration brought their own case a few days later. Immediately after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued an executive order requiring the attorney general to “pursue the death penalty for all crimes of severity demanding its use,” and in April, Attorney General Pam Bondi directed prosecutors to seek the death penalty against Mangione.

More recently, when local officials sought to investigate whether the federal officers who fatally shot Alex Pretti in Minnesota had violated state law, federal authorities blocked access to the scene. Although Gov. Tim Walz publicly pressed President Trump to allow an independent state inquiry, federal authorities continued to withhold key evidence—leading Minnesota officials to sue for access.

These cases illustrate the competing responsibilities within American criminal investigations and prosecutions. At the federal level, the attorney general leads the Department of Justice (DOJ), supervises federal prosecutions, and is accountable to the president. Although the president can set enforcement priorities, longstanding DOJ policies and norms seek to shield investigations and decisions on individual cases from political influence. At the state level, while governors may oversee certain state law-enforcement agencies, they have limited authority to initiate or intervene in a prosecution due to the independent powers granted to state attorneys general and local prosecutors under state law.

Disputes over investigations, charging decisions, and intervention raise questions about how to balance executive oversight, prosecutorial independence, and accountability.

Federal Prosecution

How Congress Created the Federal Prosecution System and Department of Justice

Federal prosecution now operates through U.S. attorneys under the DOJ—one of many federal agencies that did not exist at our nation’s founding. Article II of the Constitution gave the president responsibility for enforcing federal law but left Congress to determine how. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created an attorney general to represent the United States before the Supreme Court and to advise federal officials, along with U.S. attorneys to prosecute crimes and handle civil cases in federal districts. The attorney general initially worked part-time, without staff or authority over U.S. attorneys. Other federal lawyers worked in separate departments, with no central authority overseeing the government’s legal work.

In 1861, Congress gave the attorney general supervisory authority over U.S. attorneys, a duty initially shared with the Treasury Department. In 1870, Congress created the DOJ to consolidate federal legal work, reduce costs and corruption, and bring greater consistency to the government’s legal positions. The new department also brought federal prosecutors under the direction of one presidential appointee.

Today, the attorney general heads the DOJ and supervises federal litigation including federal criminal prosecutions, defense of federal agencies, civil rights actions, immigration enforcement, and appeals. They can also set national priorities, direct resources, and issue charging policies. Enforcement priorities change among administrations but generally include violent crime, terrorism, immigration, public corruption, fraud, drug trafficking, and organized crime. Charging policies might address which offenses to charge, when to seek mandatory minimum sentences or enhancements, and prosecutors’ positions in plea negotiations and sentencing.

U.S. attorneys working in individual districts must also deal with local courts, local problems, and local enforcement needs. Currently, 93 U.S. attorneys serve the nation’s 94 federal judicial districts with considerable freedom to decide which cases warrant federal attention and how to allocate limited resources. DOJ policy calls for consistency while recognizing that local flexibility is necessary, as the same national priorities can look different from one district to another.

Presidential Authority and Independence of the DOJ

The president’s influence over federal prosecution begins with appointments. The president nominates the attorney general and U.S. attorneys, who are subject to Senate confirmation. U.S. attorneys serve four-year terms but may remain in office until a successor is appointed and qualified; however, the president can remove them at any time. In addition to supervising U.S. attorneys, the attorney general appoints assistant U.S. attorneys, who do not require Senate confirmation. In the case of a vacancy, the attorney general can appoint an interim replacement for up to 120 days. If the vacancy remains after that time, then the federal district court can appoint someone to serve until the position is filled.

The president’s authority over DOJ officials also raises questions about political interference in individual investigations. This concern came to the forefront in 1973 when President Nixon ordered the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, who had subpoenaed White House recordings as part of the Watergate investigation. Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy refused to carry out the order and resigned, leaving Acting Attorney General Robert Bork to fire Cox. Federal lawmakers responded with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which allowed a panel of federal judges to appoint independent counsel to investigate senior government officials outside normal DOJ supervision; however, concerns about the cost, scope, and accountability of independent-counsel investigations caused Congress to let the law expire in 1999.

That same year, the DOJ adopted special-counsel regulations that remain in effect today. The attorney general (or acting attorney general, if recused) may appoint special counsel when an investigation presents a conflict of interest or extraordinary circumstances for the DOJ. For example, when Jeff Sessions recused himself in 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller to investigate Russian election interference. Special counsels operate without day-to-day supervision and can be removed only for good cause. Should the attorney general choose to reject investigative or prosecutorial steps deemed inappropriate under department practices, they must report their decision to Congress when the investigation concludes. These protections arise from regulations the DOJ can amend; however, while they do provide some independence, oversight ultimately remains within the department.

Federal law also requires the DOJ to establish rules disqualifying officials from cases involving personal, financial, or political conflicts of interest. Department policies limit communications between the DOJ and the White House about pending or contemplated investigations, with exceptions for legitimate presidential and law enforcement responsibilities. The DOJ generally avoids commenting on investigations before charges are filed, and federal regulations restrict statements that could influence the outcome of a trial. These protections rely on DOJ leadership to enforce them. Until recently, White House officials also declined to comment on pending cases; however, neither the president nor any future administration is bound to that practice.

Federal prosecutors remain part of the executive branch, which creates a potential structural conflict when an administration has an interest in the outcome of a case and the officials responsible for preventing political interference must answer to that administration.

State Prosecution

Unlike the federal system, state prosecution generally does not operate under a single chain of command. Most states rely on local prosecutors who exercise their own charging authority rather than reporting to the governor or attorney general. State attorneys general have varying powers to bring or oversee criminal cases, while governors can influence prosecution through limited powers granted by state law.

Locally Elected Prosecutors and Constitutional Authority

Voters in 45 states elect their chief local prosecutor. The state attorney general appoints local prosecutors in Alaska, while Connecticut uses a commission. In New Jersey, local prosecutors are chosen by the governor and must be confirmed by the state Senate. Delaware and Rhode Island have no local district attorneys, placing criminal prosecutions under the attorney general’s purview instead.

Local prosecutors derive their authority from state constitutions and statutes, which establish their offices and define their responsibilities. While legislatures define crimes and penalties, prosecutors have historically exercised broad discretion over enforcement—an unenumerated power that shapes local criminal justice policy as much as the law itself. Their authority has grown as plea bargaining has become central to criminal prosecutions, allowing prosecutors to consider the evidence, individual case circumstances, and public safety needs while weighing limited resources. Prosecutors may also formalize their enforcement priorities through office-wide policies, although doing so can invite public backlash. For example, Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s 2022 “Day One” memo directed prosecutors to generally decline certain low-level charges and pursue lesser charges for some offenses. Bragg ultimately revised portions of the policy following criticism from law enforcement and public officials.

State constitutions also determine where prosecutorial authority resides and how much control legislatures can exercise over it. Prosecutors in Washington State exercise executive authority, and the state Supreme Court has held that the legislature cannot compel them to bring particular charges, thereby preserving prosecutorial discretion. By contrast, Texas places district and county attorneys within the judicial branch. In 2021, the state’s highest criminal court struck down a law allowing the attorney general, an executive-branch official, to prosecute election-law violations independently, finding that the legislature could not transfer prosecutorial authority assigned to the judicial branch to an executive official.

Prosecution Powers of State Attorneys General

State attorneys general also have very different powers. The National Association of Attorneys General describes the range as running from full criminal authority to none—some can take over local cases, while others can prosecute only offenses specifically authorized by law.

Several states have expanded the attorney general’s prosecutorial authority amid concerns that some local prosecutors are unwilling to enforce certain crimes.

Governors’ Authority Over State Prosecution

Governors can influence criminal justice by proposing or vetoing criminal laws, shaping budgets and state law-enforcement priorities, filling prosecutorial vacancies, and exercising clemency. In some states, they can intervene when elected prosecutors are perceived as failing to enforce the law.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis suspended two locally elected prosecutors in 2022 and 2023 over disagreements on prosecutorial practices. Both suspensions prompted legal challenges over the limits of gubernatorial authority, with the Florida Supreme Court rejecting one challenge and a federal appellate court dismissing the other. Georgia took a different approach in 2023, establishing an eight-member independent commission to investigate, discipline, and potentially remove prosecutors.

These approaches illustrate a tension between local accountability and statewide oversight. Although voters elect prosecutors to exercise charging discretion, state officials may intervene if they believe prosecutors are not fulfilling their duties. While such authority can address inaction, it can also undermine local voters’ choices. The balance between prosecutorial independence and state oversight varies considerably, with no uniform model governing the states.

Governors can also influence criminal cases through pardons and commutations. In May 2026, Colorado Gov. Jared Polis commuted the nearly nine-year sentence of former Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters following an appellate ruling that upheld her convictions for election-related misconduct. Polis authorized her release despite objections from the local prosecutor, who argued that the decision undermined accountability. Similarly, Missouri Gov. Mike Parson commuted the sentence of former Kansas City Chiefs Assistant Coach Britt Reid in 2024 following his conviction for driving while intoxicated and seriously injuring a child. The local prosecutor publicly criticized the decision, arguing that it disregarded victims and raised concerns about unequal treatment.

When Prosecutorial Authorities Conflict

Federal and state prosecutors generally operate independently, and each can make different decisions about whether charges are warranted. While this overlapping authority can provide an additional avenue for prosecution when one jurisdiction declines to act, it can also create disagreements over enforcement priorities, charging decisions, and appropriate punishment. Federal prosecutors may act  when state authorities decline a case or when a substantial federal interest is at stake, and they may defer to state authorities when local prosecution can address the offense adequately. State and local law enforcement officers can refer cases directly to federal prosecutors, although such referrals do not guarantee federal prosecution. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, state and federal government can each prosecute conduct already prosecuted by the other without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause; however, DOJ policy discourages unnecessary repeat prosecutions.

Conclusion

Although state and federal criminal jurisdiction can overlap, the two systems exist to serve distinct purposes. Under federalism, states should bear primary responsibility for enforcing criminal law, while federal prosecutors should focus on offenses involving national interests or conduct that crosses state lines and is difficult for states to address independently. Preserving this division keeps prosecutorial decisions closer to the communities they affect while promoting the efficient use of law-enforcement resources.

Prosecutorial independence is essential to both systems. But while prosecutors need the freedom to decline weak cases, resist political or public pressure, and set their own enforcement priorities, that discretion can carry consequences. Prosecutorial decisions directly impact public safety and individual liberty, and the authority to make those decisions can be abused or exercised irresponsibly.

Watergate exposed a weakness in federal prosecutorial independence that remains unresolved. Although DOJ policies restrict White House communications about individual cases, they cannot eliminate the president’s influence over the department. The president’s power to appoint and remove the attorney general and U.S. attorneys creates opportunities for political pressure even without explicit instructions to interfere in a case. The special-counsel process presents a similar concern: The attorney general, who may have political or institutional interests in an investigation, is responsible for deciding whether to appoint a special counsel, selecting that person, defining the investigation’s scope, and supervising certain prosecutorial decisions.

Congress could take a more active role in protecting prosecutorial independence by applying the force of law to longstanding DOJ norms, increasing transparency around political interference, and establishing clearer standards for addressing conflicts of interest. It could also reconsider whether the appointment and supervision of special counsels should depend so heavily on executive officials who may have interests in the investigations they oversee. Such measures would provide durable protections against political influence while preserving executive oversight and accountability.

Oversight tensions also exist at the state level, where governors and attorneys general have sought greater authority to remove, override, or intervene in the decisions of local prosecutors. While intervention may be warranted when prosecutors engage in misconduct, have conflicts of interest, or fail to fulfill their legal duties, using that authority to punish lawful exercises of discretion risks allowing state officials to substitute their own political priorities for those of the communities that elected the prosecutors.

Balancing the will of voters, the independence of prosecutors, the need to administer justice impartially, and the need for oversight when things go wrong is difficult. Getting it right requires clear limits on political intervention without insulating prosecutors from accountability for misconduct or failure to fulfill their duties. Until lawmakers draw those lines in statute, prosecutorial independence will last only as long as presidents and governors choose to respect it.

Part 3 will examine how prosecutorial discretion operates in practice, including decisions about which cases to pursue, what charges to file, and when to negotiate resolutions.