Rescissions Reaffirm Congress’s Power of the Purse

On June 3, President Donald J. Trump sent Congress a formal rescissions package proposing to cancel $9.3 billion in previously appropriated—but unobligated—federal funds. The administration has also signaled its intent to submit additional rescission packages. This is a textbook example of how the executive branch can properly initiate budget discipline while maintaining the proper separation of powers.

Passed by Congress in response to executive abuses from President Richard Nixon, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) created a lawful and structured way for the president to propose cuts to spending for the current fiscal year. Under the ICA, the president can propose a rescission—that is, a cancellation of budget authority—of money that has not been formally committed to a specific purpose by executive agencies.

Importantly, when Congress appropriates funding, the dollars do not immediately transfer from the Treasury. First, agencies must obligate the funds to a specific purpose. Until that obligation occurs, the president may propose to “impound” the funds and ask Congress to rescind them.

Under the ICA, once a president sends a rescission request to Congress—via a “special message” transmitted to both chambers—a 45-day countdown begins. That clock is measured in “calendar days of continuous session,” rather than legislative days, which means it includes weekends and holidays (unless the break exceeds three days). If Congress does not act within that time, then the president must release the withheld funds. This framework codifies a constitutional balance: The president may propose, but Congress disposes. It reinforces Congress’s primacy over the power of the purse while allowing the executive branch to raise concerns about spending it views as unnecessary or unwise.

In this case, Trump’s proposal targets major discretionary outlays—including nearly $1.1 billion in cuts to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and roughly $8.3 billion in foreign aid—many stemming from recommendations by the administration’s Department of Government Efficiency.

The House passed its version of the rescission bill, which included all the rescissions requested in Trump’s rescission memo, on June 12. Now it is up to the Senate to pass its own version, kicking off a potential ping-pong of amended bills between the chambers or reaching a compromise through a conference committee. If Congress ultimately wants to rescind the funds (or even a subset of the funds), the president must sign the bill before July 19—otherwise, the law requires the impounded funds to be spent.

Rescission bills follow a special expedited process, as they are not subject to a filibuster. Once received, the president’s proposal is referred to the Appropriations Committee, the Budget Committee, and any relevant authorizing committees. The Budget Committee has 20 days to submit its views, and the Appropriations Committee then has five days to act. If they do not meet that deadline—July 7, in this case—any senator can move to discharge the bill from committee. Because of the special nature of a rescission bill, debate is limited and a filibuster is not possible. Amendments are allowed; however, they must directly relate to the bill’s subject. As there is no limit on how many amendments may be offered, this process can lead to a “vote-a-rama”—a series of back-to-back amendment votes that, like a filibuster, can slow proceedings and force tough votes that highlight political differences. A simple majority vote is required for final passage.

With the statutory timeline in mind, some in the administration are reportedly exploring an alternative known as a “pocket rescission” for a future rescission package. This maneuver would involve sending a rescission message and impounding funds within 45 days of the end of the fiscal year, effectively running out the clock until the spending authority provided by Congress—whether from an appropriations bill or a continuing resolution—expires.

While the pocket rescission may be viable in theory, the Government Accountability Office has declared such a move unlawful. The legislative agency warns that a pocket rescission would violate the ICA’s requirement that funds be available for “prudent obligation” before their expiration; however, the Office of Management and Budget, housed within the Executive Office of the President, disagrees with this interpretation. To avoid a standoff between the legislative and executive branches, Congress should amend the ICA to make it clear that the power of the purse belongs to Congress—just as the Framers intended.

Though narrow in fiscal impact at less than 0.1 percent of the federal budget, the rescission request is constitutionally significant. It serves as a procedural reaffirmation of both executive accountability and legislative authority. Presidents cannot unilaterally cancel spending—they must seek congressional approval. But when funds are deemed unnecessary (and their intended purpose no longer relevant), the president is empowered to recommend fiscal restraint.

Congress has a choice: It can support a targeted rollback of unobligated spending, or it can allow the funds to flow. Amid the debate of specific appropriations and rescissions, the important takeaway is that the decision lies where it constitutionally should: with the First Branch.