Low-Energy Fridays: Why is it so hard to get nations to agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

I recently wrote a piece for The Dispatch on why Republicans are so reluctant to participate in the “Conference of the Parties” (COP), the annual United Nations-hosted forum to negotiate climate issues. The answer lies in the belief shared by many COP participants that the United States should undertake climate action, but other nations should not share the same burden (often based on justifications like historical or per-capita emissions).

You can read more in that piece, but there is a broader 101-level issue to keep in mind: Climate change is a classic “prisoner’s dilemma,” and overcoming its game theory dynamic is exceptionally hard. While climate-concerned folks would prefer global cooperation, it’s not in every nation’s self-interest.

There have been two international climate treaties. The first was the Kyoto Protocol (KP) of 1997, largely considered a failure. The KP divided the world into richer and poorer countries and imposed emission abatement targets on the rich while poorer countries had no requirements. This makes sense, except the division was such that some of the largest emitters—like China and Russia—had no burdens, while Western nations had substantial requirements. Unsurprisingly, the United States declined to participate.

The other major international climate treaty is the Paris Agreement (PA) of 2015. Still in effect today, the PA acts as a vehicle by which nations can make “nationally determined contributions” voluntarily. In other words, nations set their own targets under the PA, and the agreement facilitates the verification and negotiation of those targets. But without imposing requirements on participating countries, the PA hasn’t had much of an effect, as nations largely promise to do what they were already doing anyway.

So, what dynamics impede global climate cooperation? There are two conventional aspects to consider: 1) the game theory elements that favor freeriding and 2) the disparity of costs relative to benefits for treaty negotiators.

First up is game theory—the science of how decisions are made. A classic example of game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma, a hypothetical scenario in which the police capture and interrogate two bank robbers. They present each robber with the option to either betray their partner or remain silent. The optimal outcome is that both robbers remain silent, yielding a light sentence for both. If one betrays the other, they avoid prison time completely while their partner gets a long sentence; however, if they betray each other, they both end up with moderate sentences. Thus, while cooperation is optimal, the individual incentive for each robber is to defect in order to avoid the worst outcome and have a chance at the best.

Climate change is a similar issue. The best outcome for one nation is to freeride on the climate progress of others so they get all the benefits without incurring any cost; the worst is to undertake big climate burdens when no one else does, resulting in significant costs but no climate benefits. From a negotiation perspective, something more is needed to overcome this challenge than the assumption that nations will undertake climate commitments as a matter of goodwill.

The second issue is that the relative costs and benefits of climate action don’t favor all parties equally. Even though clean energy is cheap (as explained in other pieces), it’s not a perfect substitute for fossil fuels. For power-hungry and coal-rich nations like China, the cheapest path is to keep burning lots of carbon-intensive coal. For wealthier nations like those in Europe that rely on imported energy sources, clean energy has comparatively more economic benefit. The energy security benefit is appealing to Europe and partially explains their willingness to focus on quitting fossil fuels (for which they are especially reliant on Russia).

Climate change doesn’t have the same impact everywhere. Some low-lying island nations live with the existential threat of rising sea levels. Other nations, like Russia, prefer higher temperatures that may improve the productivity of land in cold regions. This shows that while some nations may not benefit significantly from climate action, others have no incentive to accept any deal short of one that effectively halts climate change. As a result, it’s exceedingly difficult to get interests to align on this issue. The nations that care the most have the least ability to effect change, while the biggest emitters may not see much value in curbing emissions.

It’s outside the scope of this piece to explain exactly what should be done about it; however, it’s important to understand that the climate negotiation dynamics are so hard to overcome that it’s unlikely there will ever be a global deal that satisfies all participants. It may be possible to overcome these challenges by tying climate goals to other issues (e.g., trade deals), and some have suggested the United States should push for such a strategy owing to the country’s “carbon advantage” and Europe’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. But the 1990s vision of a global limit on greenhouse gas emissions (à la the KP) is unlikely to occur anytime soon.

Ultimately, every nation weighs different costs and benefits from climate action. This, combined with the issue’s global nature, makes it extremely hard to align interests to the point of garnering an agreement. It’s why the PA focuses on voluntary contributions rather than set targets. The difficulty in achieving consensus also explains why it’s so important for climate treaties to be negotiated better, and particularly in a way that can endure political shifts—something past efforts have fallen short on.