Review of “Harnessing Unclaimed Funds for Election Administration”
Derek Clinger’s proposal looks to unclaimed financial assets as a source of dedicated state-level election funding and introduces a creative and grounded approach to the chronic underfunding of election administration. By drawing on a resource that already exists within state control and does not require federal action or new taxes, this concept addresses two perennial barriers to election funding: sustainability and political optics.
The scale of the unclaimed-funds pool—over $108 billion nationally by Clinger’s estimation—suggests real potential. Even modest diversions could provide reliable, recurring support for local election offices whose budgets often depend on volatile local revenues and episodic state and federal grants. The proposal also benefits from precedent. Unclaimed funds are already used for other public purposes from education to housing to infrastructure. Extending that logic to election administration is consistent with how states have treated similar idle assets, and it would be in service of the critical infrastructure designation placed on election administration.
This proposal is feasible—legally, fiscally, and administratively. Nearly every state already manages unclaimed property programs by statute, meaning legislatures can amend those laws without constitutional change and without any federal input or voter approval. Clinger suggested several workable policy models—including fixed annual allocations, earmarking from specific sources of unclaimed funds, or investing principal amounts and using only the earnings.
We believe that the most viable models for using unclaimed funds include a specific carveout for election administration either as a percentage of total annual receipts or after an annual threshold of new deposits is reached. Moreover, it is most politically feasible if that carveout has a maximum annual cap for election administration. For example, we imagine either a state designating X percent of all new deposits or that all deposits above a Y-dollar threshold be earmarked for election administration and capped at Z dollars per year. This structure creates somewhat predictable and stable annual funding and, crucially, avoids direct competition with other budget priorities.
Still, feasibility will vary by state. It is most attainable where 1) the state’s unclaimed-funds balance is large and stable, 2) the treasurer or controller already manages similar earmarked funds, and 3) political leadership values predictable election funding but resists new taxation. It will be least feasible in states where 1) unclaimed-fund balances are small or volatile, 2) competing statutory or budgetary commitments already drain those accounts, or 3) legislators view election administration as a low-priority expenditure compared with spending categories like education or public safety.
For advocates, the political lift will come from framing elections as essential civic infrastructure—less a discretionary program and more akin to maintaining roads or water systems. The ideal legislative champion would likely be one who sits on the state legislature’s elections committee with a close connection to the chair of the appropriations committee.
The proposal is not without risks. We imagine four such risks—including supplanting previously appropriated state funding for elections, competition with other policy advocates, public perception, and potential legal challenges. First, we believe that some state legislators could treat these funds as a convenient excuse to reduce baseline state appropriations for elections, yielding no net funding increase. Guardrails such as statutory maintenance-of-effort clauses or restrictions on use—e.g., modernization, cybersecurity, staffing—could help prevent this supplantation.
Second, unclaimed funds may attract fierce competition from programs with stronger public constituencies. Education, housing, and health initiatives are politically easier sells. As Clinger notes, even sports stadium funding advocates might become competitors for this funding. Election funding lacks a strong natural advocacy base, meaning even a modest redirection of funds from other policy priorities could become contentious.
Third, there is the public perception of unfairly taking private property, even if unclaimed, for an essential government service like election administration. While most states already repurpose unclaimed assets responsibly, advocates should consider the optics of directing those assets toward administrative functions rather than more sympathetic public benefits.
Finally, there are potential legal concerns. Although courts have long upheld states’ authority over unclaimed property, the formerly private source of the funds could create blowback in light of the recent push in many states against private funding for elections. Policymakers must ensure that statutory language distinguishes unclaimed-fund transfers from private donations, especially in states with laws restricting private funding of election administration.
Clinger’s proposal is one of the more inventive and pragmatic ideas to emerge in recent years on election funding. It passes the tests of sustainability and scale and—under the right conditions—could meet the test of feasibility. The idea has obvious risks, and the feasibility is not the same for all jurisdictions. But we believe that policymakers and advocates would benefit from refining this proposal for implementation, exploring pilot opportunities in willing states, and gathering data on fiscal and political performance.
Co-author Matthew Weil is vice president of the Governance Program at the Bipartisanship Policy Center. He has also served at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, and the American Enterprise Institute.