Hidden Infrastructure: Why CVE Funding Is a National Security Imperative

In the sprawling landscape of cybersecurity, few systems are as simultaneously critical and underappreciated as the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) program. For more than two decades, this modest database has served as the authoritative reference for publicly known software vulnerabilities, providing a common language that security professionals, vendors, and organizations worldwide rely upon to understand and remediate cyber risks. Yet despite its foundational role in global cybersecurity, the CVE system operates on a shoestring budget and faces persistent funding uncertainty that threatens not just a technical resource, but a vital component of national security infrastructure.

Understanding what CVEs represent requires looking beyond their technical function. At their core, CVEs are unique identifiers assigned to publicly disclosed software vulnerabilities. When a security researcher discovers a flaw in widely used software—whether it is a critical vulnerability in an operating system, a weakness in a web framework, or a defect in an Internet of Things device—that vulnerability receives a CVE identifier. This standardized naming convention allows disparate organizations to coordinate their response, track patches, and prioritize remediation efforts without confusion about which vulnerability they are addressing.

But the CVE system’s value extends far beyond simple nomenclature. It represents something increasingly rare in our digital ecosystem: essential coordination infrastructure that enables effective cybersecurity across the entire economy.

A Pragmatic Case for Targeted Public Investment

Even the staunchest advocates of limited government recognize certain legitimate coordination functions including standardized weights and measures, navigation aids, and basic research with broad applications. The CVE program falls squarely within this narrow category. It is not an example of market inadequacy; rather, it is a textbook case where the nature of the good itself demands a neutral coordinator.

Vulnerability information requires universal adoption of a single standard to maximize its utility. The value lies not in competing systems but in everyone from Fortune 500 companies and startups to government agencies and critical infrastructure operators using the same reference framework. When fragmentation occurs, coordination breaks down and everyone loses—including those who might prefer proprietary alternatives. Vulnerability tracking is fundamentally a standardization challenge, not a market problem. Everyone benefits when everyone uses the same system.

As a public-private partnership administered by the MITRE Corporation and funded by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the CVE program’s limited scope, clear mission, and measurable impact exemplify effective government. For a modest investment of tens of millions annually (a rounding error in federal cybersecurity spending) it provides the coordination infrastructure that enables billions in value across the global economy. It also establishes common standards, maintains essential coordination mechanisms, and enables private-sector innovation, making it a model for what a limited, effective government solution should look like.

Yet this pragmatic, proven solution remains chronically vulnerable to funding uncertainty. The program nearly shut down during the April 2025 funding crisis before receiving an 11-month extension, demonstrating how congressional budgetary chaos can threaten even the most cost-effective programs. When policymakers treat CVE funding as discretionary rather than recognizing it as core infrastructure, they undermine one of government’s genuine success stories in cybersecurity coordination.

Transparency as a Strategic Asset

The national security imperative for CVE funding becomes clearer when we consider the strategic value of transparency in cybersecurity. In an era when software vulnerabilities represent vectors for espionage, sabotage, and warfare, the ability to rapidly identify, communicate, and remediate security flaws across complex supply chains is more than a convenience—it is a strategic necessity.

Consider the cascading implications of a single high-impact vulnerability. When a critical flaw emerges in widely deployed software, the race begins between defenders seeking to patch systems and adversaries seeking to exploit the window of vulnerability. The CVE system accelerates the defender’s side of this equation by providing immediate, authoritative information that enables coordinated response. Security teams can quickly determine whether their systems are affected, vendors can prioritize patch development, and automated security tools can update their detection signatures. This process is efficient because all parties share a common reference point.

Without this coordinated infrastructure, each organization would assess threats independently, potentially duplicating efforts or, more dangerously, missing critical vulnerabilities. The fragmentation would advantage attackers, who already benefit from asymmetric information advantages. Adversaries need only find and exploit a single vulnerability, while defenders must address all of them.

This dynamic explains why transparency paradoxically serves defensive interests better than opacity and why “security through obscurity” is considered bad practice. Some argue that publicly cataloging vulnerabilities provides a roadmap for attackers. While superficially logical, this concern ignores the reality that sophisticated adversaries already possess advanced vulnerability research capabilities. What public disclosure and standardized tracking actually do is level the playing field for defenders—particularly smaller organizations and under-resourced entities that lack dedicated security research teams.

The CVE system democratizes defensive cybersecurity intelligence, ensuring that a startup in Kansas and a critical infrastructure operator in Ohio have access to the same vulnerability information as a Fortune 500 company with a dedicated security operations center. This democratization has profound benefits to national security, as the strength of America’s cyber defenses depends not on the capabilities of its most sophisticated defenders but on the baseline security of its most vulnerable systems.

The Fragmentation Risk

The chronic funding uncertainty creates conditions for a dangerous fragmentation scenario. When the central CVE system struggles with resource constraints, it manifests in slower processing times, delayed vulnerability listings, or inconsistent quality control, and alternative systems emerge to fill the vacuum. We are already seeing this pattern, with various commercial vendors, security consortiums, and international bodies developing parallel vulnerability tracking systems. The European Union launched its European Vulnerability Database in response to the April 2025 funding crisis, the Computer Incident Response Center in Luxembourg developed the Global CVE Allocation System, and CVE board members established the CVE Foundation as an alternative governance structure.

This competition might seem beneficial on the surface, as competitive pressure drives innovation and efficiency in traditional markets. But vulnerability tracking is not a traditional market—it is a coordination problem where value primarily lies in the universal adoption of a single standard. Multiple competing standards do not improve the system; instead, they degrade it with confusion, duplicate effort, and dangerous gaps in coverage.

Imagine a scenario in which different sectors adopt different vulnerability identification systems: one for financial services, another for healthcare, a third for industrial control systems, and multiple international alternatives. Vendors releasing security patches would need to cross-reference multiple systems. Automated security tools would struggle to integrate disparate data sources. Organizations with complex technology stacks would face the nightmare of mapping vulnerabilities across incompatible frameworks. The cognitive overhead alone would slow response times and increase the likelihood of critical vulnerabilities falling through the cracks.

This fragmentation would harm smaller organizations and under-resourced sectors in particular, as adversaries increasingly view these entities as soft entry points into larger supply chains. The 2020 SolarWinds compromise illustrated how attackers exploit trusted relationships and supply chain connections to reach high-value targets. Fragmented vulnerability tracking would make it harder to identify systemic risks and coordinate responses across these interconnected networks.

From a national security perspective, fragmentation also complicates international coordination. The global adoption of the CVE system—with hundreds of CVE Numbering Authorities from dozens of countries—makes it a rare example of successful international cybersecurity cooperation. Partners and allies can share threat intelligence efficiently because they use common terminology. Fragmenting this system would balkanize cybersecurity information sharing precisely when geopolitical tensions demand greater coordination among democratic allies.

Why Private Provision Fails This Specific Test

The occasional suggestion that private enterprise should operate vulnerability tracking deserves serious analysis. After all, cybersecurity is a massive, innovative market with vendors possessing substantial resources and expertise. But vulnerability tracking presents unique characteristics that make commercial operation both inefficient and potentially counterproductive.

The core problem is perverse incentives. A commercial vulnerability database operator maximizes value by providing superior information to paying customers, creating pressure to delay or limit public disclosure to maintain competitive advantage. This directly contradicts the transparency that makes vulnerability disclosure effective for the broader ecosystem. When a company’s business model depends on information asymmetry, society loses the coordination benefits that make CVE valuable.

Commercial operation would almost certainly create tiered access models in which premium subscribers receive faster, more comprehensive information than free-tier users. But cybersecurity isn’t like other information services—the weakest link determines overall security. When a hospital system or municipal infrastructure operator cannot afford premium vulnerability intelligence, their compromised systems become entry points that threaten the entire network, including those who paid for premium access. This is a case where universally available information produces better outcomes for everyone, including commercial entities that might prefer exclusivity.

Private ownership also raises questions about data integrity and independence that matter for a coordination mechanism. When vendors control their own vulnerability disclosures, they face incentives to silently patch critical bugs rather than assign CVEs, perhaps under fear of negative press or loss of user trust. While certainly imperfect, government backing provides the greater assurance of impartiality essential for a trusted reference standard.

Perhaps most importantly, privatization would accelerate fragmentation. Multiple commercial providers competing for market share would each develop proprietary systems attempting to lock in customers. The network effects that make a single, universal standard valuable would work in reverse, with each competing standard diminishing the utility of all others. We would waste resources on duplicative systems while losing the coordination benefits that justify the investment.

The specific technical and economic characteristics of vulnerability tracking make commercial provision unsuitable here. Markets work brilliantly for most cybersecurity services, but this coordination function is an exception. Limited government should perform core functions effectively, and CVEs represent exactly that: a narrow, well-defined role that enables private-sector security efforts.

Cost-Effective Core Infrastructure

The case for robust CVE funding rests on straightforward return-on-investment analysis. The digital economy represents trillions of dollars in annual economic activity, with virtually every sector now dependent on complex software systems. Cybersecurity failures cost the U.S. economy hundreds of billions annually through data breaches, ransomware, intellectual property theft, and operational disruptions. The CVE system provides foundational infrastructure enabling systematic risk management across this entire ecosystem—and its value far exceeds its operational costs.

Consider what adequately funded CVE operations provide:

• Faster vulnerability processing to reduce exposure windows.
• Improved quality control to minimize time wasted on false positives.
• Better international coordination to address global supply chains.
• Enhanced automation interfaces to improve integration with security tools.
• Expanded coverage to address emerging technology domains.

These improvements have force-multiplier effects across the economy at minimal public expense. Faster CVE processing means quicker patch deployment economy-wide. Better quality control means more efficient security operations across thousands of organizations. Expanded coverage means fewer blind spots for attackers to exploit. Few public expenditures deliver comparable returns per dollar invested.

Fundamentally, allowing CVE operations to struggle from inadequate resources sends a dangerous signal about priorities and competence. It suggests that policymakers cannot distinguish between essential infrastructure and discretionary programs. When the next major cyber incident prompts questions about inadequate defenses, pointing to chronically underfunded infrastructure (even if proven cost- effective) will not satisfy anyone.

Getting Priorities Right

The CVE funding question ultimately tests whether policymakers can distinguish essential infrastructure from the sprawl of discretionary programs. Traditional national security infrastructure like military bases, intelligence capabilities, and diplomatic presence receives sustained, predictable funding because policymakers understand their strategic importance. Cyber infrastructure deserves the same disciplined assessment and commitment.

The CVE system may lack the visibility of more dramatic cybersecurity initiatives. It is not flashy and admittedly quite boring. It does not involve offensive capabilities, sophisticated AI, or classified programs. It is essentially a well-maintained database operating for more than 25 years. But databases become strategic assets when they enable coordination at scale. The CVE system functions like air traffic control for cybersecurity—unsexy and technical, but exactly the kind of thing government should do well.

Providing a reliable source of funding to sustain CVEs should be among the easiest cybersecurity policy decisions to make. It requires modest, well-defined resources; enjoys broad stakeholder support across industry and government; provides clear, measurable value; and represents limited government’s ability to perform a core coordination function effectively.

The persistent funding uncertainty reflects a troubling failure to apply basic analytical discipline. As a nation, we can easily afford to fund CVE operations adequately. But the question is whether we can maintain focus on what government should actually do: provide essential infrastructure, enable private-sector security efforts, and avoid the chaos and waste that comes from fragmentation and duplicated effort.

When government succeeds at narrow, well-defined missions like CVE, it strengthens the case for limiting government to those core functions. When it lets even proven, cost-effective programs languish from inattention and budget chaos, it reinforces every skeptic’s concern about government competence. CVE funding should be an easy win for effective governance. Not only does getting this right matter for cybersecurity, it also demonstrates that limited government can govern effectively when properly focused on genuine public goods.