

Are Changes in Markets Increasing Ethical Challenges?

Competition as the (Partial) Antidote to Bad Behavior

Harvard Electricity Policy Group

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Overview

- I. Institutions and Behaviors
 - Regulated monopoly
 - Quasi-restructured
 - Fully restructured
- II. Outlook
- III. Policy Implications



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ELECTRIC COMPETITION: THE ANTIDOTE FOR BAD BEHAVIOR

By Devin Hartman and Mike Haugh

The New York Times

PUC CHIEF'S EMAILS WITH UTILITIES INDICATE IMPROPRIETY Regulator was 'dear

Regulator was 'dear friend' of Edison
Emails show CPUC chief had meelings at bars, restaurants, across the globe
Newty obtained emails auggest that

Newly obtained emails suggest that improper contacts between the former California Public Utilities Commission president and utility executives were me

When Utility Money Talks

Corruption scandals in Ohio and Illinois reveal an unsavory underside to the politics of energy.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

VS.

DAVID LOTT HARDY,

Appellee-Defendant.






Entergy Paid Actors Scandal

The Post and Courier

Institutions & Incentives = Behavior

- NOT a few bad actors flawed institutions
- Reg monopolies' perverse incentive structure
 - Notorious economic & political incentives
 (e.g., Kahn, 1970)

Political Economy of
Regulatory Disingenuousness
"rent-seeking strategies and
the political maladies"



Regulated Monopolies & Rent Seeking

Legal and Routine

- Within regulatory process
- Regulatory circumvention (e.g., MN, VA)
- "Charitable" contributions
- "Creative" ballot initiatives (e.g., NV, FL)
- "Influencing" consumer advocates (e.g., IN, IL?)

Illegal and Periodic

- Ex parte to bribery
- Dark money



STRINGS ATTACHED

How utilities use charitable giving to influence politics and increase investor profits

December 2019

Virginia Poverty
Law Center:
imbalances in
Virginia's electric
utility regulation
Aug. 19, 2020



Florida's outrageously deceptive solar ballot initiative, explained Amendment 1 is a


utility scam.


Nov. 8 2016


(Quasi?) Competition to the Rescue!

- Textbook restructuring:
 - Separate non/competitive functions
- "Quarantine" the distribution monopoly
 - 1. Independent of retail supply role
 - 2. Untethered GenCo interest
- Monopoly tethers from transition policy

ONLY Texas Fully Restructured








Entangled Monopolies: Ohio & Illinois

- Retain monopoly rent seeking conduits
 - Cross subsidy vehicles
 - Default supply
 - Riders (e.g., rate stabilization)
- Amplified motive
 - Instrumental corporate interest
 - Monopoly lobbies for affiliates
- Ohio: Duke Energy (divested) vs. entangled utilities
- Policy implementation, not competition, at fault!

Competition as Partial Antidote

Institutional Decay + Misinformation = Subsidy Culture



Outlook: stressed rent seeking conduits

- Information asymmetry increasing
- Stock turnover

 incumbent displacement
- Synergy with climate & green industrial policy

How Utilities Team Up With Greens Against Consumers

Oregonians are learning that electric companies like renewables because costlier systems increase profits.

Vs.

Putting Consumers & Climate First

Governor Pritzker's Eight Principles for a Clean & Renewable Illinois Economy

- Competition-choice incrementalism
 - E.g., direct access vs. "do it right!"

Policy Implications

- 1. Restructure properly.
 - A. Thorough generation divestiture.
 - B. Remove monopoly default service.
 - C. PUCs rectify cross-subsidies and vestigial relations.
- 2. Regulate distribution monopolies properly.
- 3. Improve information.
- 4. Remain disciplined.

Thank you!

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Paper link:

https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final-No-205-electric-competition-updated.pdf