The Many Faces of Government Default
This record reflects a perpetual political temptation, memorably described by the sardonic observer of sovereign defaults, Max Winkler in 1933. Of “the politicians in the borrowing countries,” he wrote, “from Abyssinia to Zanzibar”—which we may update to Argentina to Zambia, both governments having defaulted again in 2020—“Tomorrow they may be swept out of office. Today they can live only by yielding to the multiple undertaking of expenditures . . . and exchange favors by the misuse of the public treasury. In order to enjoy the present, they cheerfully mortgage the future.” Of course, we can’t read this without thinking of the Biden $1.9 trillion project to spend, borrow, and print.
Often enough, historically speaking, booming government debt has resulted in “national bankruptcy and default” around the world. Winkler chronicled the long list of government defaults up to the 1930s. He predicted that future investors would again be “gazing sadly” on unpaid government promises to pay. He was so right. Since then, the list of sovereign defaults has grown much longer.
A Short Quiz: Here are six sets of years. What do they represent?
- 1827, 1890, 1951, 1956, 1982, 1989, 2001, 2014, 2020
- 1828, 1898, 1902, 1914, 1931, 1937, 1961, 1964, 1983, 1986, 1990
- 1826, 1843, 1860, 1894, 1932, 2012
- 1876, 1915, 1931, 1940, 1959, 1965, 1978, 1982
- 1826, 1848, 1860, 1865, 1892, 1898, 1982, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2004, 2017
- 1862, 1933, 1968, 1971
All these are years of defaults by a sample of governments. They are, respectively, the governments of:
- Argentina
- Brazil
- Greece
- Turkey
- Venezuela
- The United States.
In the case of the United States, the defaults consisted of the refusal to redeem demand notes for gold or silver, as promised, in 1862; the refusal to redeem gold bonds for gold, as promised, in 1933; the refusal to redeem silver certificates for silver, as promised, in 1968; and the refusal to redeem the dollar claims of foreign governments for gold, as promised, in 1971.
With the onset of the Civil War in 1861, the war effort proved vastly more costly than previously imagined. To pay expenses, Congress authorized a circulating currency in the form of “demand notes,” which were redeemable in precious metal coins on the bearer’s demand and promised so on their face. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase declared that “being at all times convertible into coin at the option of the holder . . . they must always be equivalent to gold.” But soon after, by the beginning of 1862, the U.S. government was no longer able to honor such redemptions, so stopped doing so. To support the use of the notes anyway, Congress declared them to be legal tender which had to be accepted in payment of debts. About issuing pure paper money, President Lincoln quoted the Bible: “Silver and gold have I none.”
In 1933, outstanding U.S. Treasury bonds included “gold bonds,” which unambiguously promised that the investor could choose to be paid in gold coin. However, President Roosevelt and Congress decided that paying as promised was “against public policy” and refused. Bondholders sued and got to the Supreme Court, which held 5-4 that the government can exercise its sovereign power in this fashion. Shortly before, when running for office in 1932, Roosevelt had said, “no responsible government would have sold to the country securities payable in gold if it knew that the promise—yes, the covenant—embodied in these securities was . . . dubious.” A recent history of this failure to pay as agreed concludes it was an “excusable default.”
In the 1960s, the U.S. still had coins made out of real silver and dollar bills which were “silver certificates.” These dollars promised on their face that they could be redeemed from the U.S. Treasury for one silver dollar on demand. But when inflation and the increasing value of silver induced people to ask for redemptions as promised, the government decided to stop honoring them. If today you have a silver certificate still bearing the government’s unambiguous promise, this promise will not be kept—no silver dollar for you. The silver in that unpaid silver dollar is currently worth about $20 in paper money.
An underlying idea in the 1944 Bretton Woods international monetary agreement was that “the United States dollar and gold are synonymous,” but in 1971 the U.S. reneged on its Bretton Woods agreement to redeem dollars held by foreign governments for gold. This historic default moved the world to the pure fiat money regime which continues today, although it has experienced numerous financial and currency crises, as well as endemic inflation. Since 1971, the U.S. government has stopped promising to redeem its money for anything else, and the U.S. Treasury has stopped promising to pay its debt with anything except the government’s own fiat currency. This prevents explicit defaults in nominal terms, but does not prevent creating high inflation and depreciation of both the currency and the government debt, which are implicit defaults.
Winkler related a pointed story to give us an archetype of government debt from ancient Greek times. Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, was hard up and couldn’t pay his debts to his subjects, the tale goes. So he issued a decree requiring that all silver coins had to be turned in to the government, on pain of death. When he had the coins, reminted them, “Stamping at two drachmae each one-drachma coin.” Brilliant! With these, he paid off his nominal debt, becoming, Winkler said, “the Father of Currency Devaluation” and thereby expropriating real wealth from his subjects.
Observe that Dionysius’s stratagem was, in essence, the same as that of the United States in its defaults of 1862, 1933, 1968, and 1971. In all cases, like Dionysius, the U.S. government broke a promise, depreciated its currency, and reduced its obligations at the expense of its creditors. Default can have many faces.
So convenient it is to be a sovereign when you can’t pay as promised.
